Many crimes have a serious social stigma and pleadings often recognize this by abandoning the most stigmatizing offense (such as rape) in favor of a less stigmatizing offense (such as assault or serious assault). Existing drug legislation provides for an increase in maximum penalties and, in some cases, minimum penalties for many offences based on previous criminal convictions of an accused. See for example. B 21 U.S.C. §841 (b) (1) (A), (B) and (C), 848 (a), 960 (b) (1), (2) and (3) and 962. However, a court may not impose such an increased sentence unless the United States prosecutor has filed with the court, before trial or before admitting guilt, information affining previous convictions on which one can rely. See 21 U.S.C§ 851. The primary purpose of a federal plea for the accused is to get the best possible deal. These are often aggressive negotiations with the federal prosecutor to convince them that they are unlikely to have a conviction.

If the U.S. Assistant Prosecutor thinks a jury may not have found the defendant guilty, they will likely agree to a better deal. Theoretical work based on the prisoners` dilemma is one of the reasons why pleadings are banned in many countries. Often, it is precisely the scenario of the prisoner`s dilemma that applies: it is in the interest of both suspects to oppose the other suspect and testify, regardless of the innocence of the accused. The worst is probably if only one party is guilty: here, the innocent is not induced to confess, while the guilty is strongly induced to confess and testify against the innocent (including false testimony). [Citation required] However, the plea will often determine the verdict of the federal judge and most defendants accept the pleading agreement because their chances of getting a conviction and a harsher sentence are high. Comment. Every federal prosecutor should be guided by these principles in the execution of his or her criminal prosecution, unless a modification or derogation from these principles has been authorized in accordance with the provisions of JM 9-27.140. However, it is not provided that the reference to these principles requires, in a given case, a specific decision of the prosecutor. On the contrary, these principles are established for the sole purpose of assisting government lawyers in deciding how best to exercise their authority in fulfilling their obligations.

2. Sentencing agreements. There are only two kinds of sentence boxes. Both are admissible, but one is more complicated than the other. First, prosecutors can negotiate a sentence that falls within the scope defined by the United States Sentencing Commission. This means that, for an indicative value of 18 to 24 months, the prosecutor may agree, at his discretion, to recommend a sentence of 18 to 20 months, for example, instead of arguing for a sentence at the top of the range. Such a means does not require that the actual amount of the sentence be determined in advance. The appeal agreement may be formulated in such a way that the United States, once the margin has been set by the court, recommends a specific point in this area. Similarly, the prosecutor may agree to recommend a downward adjustment for the assumption of responsibility if he or she concludes in good faith that the defendant is entitled to the accommodation. Second, the prosecutor may attempt to deviate from the directives. It is more complicated than a good deal that contains a sentence in one area of the directive.

Departures are treated more generally below. Comment. Sufficient evidence to support a conviction is required under Rule 29(a) of the Federal Penal Code to avoid a judgment of acquittal. In addition, both for reasons of fairness in principle and in the interest of the efficient administration of justice, no proceedings should be brought against a person unless the government`s counsel considers that the admissible evidence is sufficient to obtain and maintain a guilty verdict by an impartial Trier. . . .